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SEPARATION OF POWERS: A
SOLUTION TO AN OLD PROBLEM
State Tax Commission v. Administrative Hearing Commission1
The growth of administrative agencies during the twentieth century has
presented Missouri courts with a difficult analytical problem. The Missouri
Constitution2 requires that "[t]he powers of government shall be divided into
three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial" and that no
person in one governmental department "shall exercise any power properly be-
longing to either of the others."3 Yet administrative agencies, which are part
of the executive or legislative branch, often determine facts, apply law, and
perform other duties that traditionally have been viewed as "judicial" or
"legislative. '4
A variety of approaches have been employed to resolve this conflict be-
tween the separation of powers doctrine and administrative adjudication. For
Missouri courts, the most common approach is to determine whether the ad-
ministrative agency's function is "judicial," as opposed to "administrative" or
"quasi-judicial." If its function is deemed judicial, the agency's action is said
to be unconstitutional.5 If its function is merely "administrative" or "quasi-
1. 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
2. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 1.
3. Thirty-eight state constitutions explicitly require the separation of govern-
mental powers. Twelve state constitutions, like the federal Constitution, establish three
separate government departments without an independent separation of powers clause.
New Hampshire's Constitution has a unique separation of powers clause. It calls for
the three branches to be as separate "as the nature of a free government will admit, or
as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the consti-
tution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity." N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, Art. 37; see
Utton, Constitutional Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Functions by Adminis-
trative Agencies, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 620-21 nn.109-12 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.020 (Supp. 1983) where under Missouri's
Workers' Compensation Law an administrative judge may determine such issues as
whether the injured party is an employee (§ 287.020(l)), whether the injury resulted
from an accident (§ 287.020(2)), whether the employee suffered an injury (§
287.020(3)), and whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employee's
employment (§ 287:020(5)).
5. See, e.g., State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 303 Mo.
212, 219, 259 S.W. 445, 447 (1924) (an award of damages by the Public Service Com-
mission was unconstitutional because this action was a judicial function and must be
assigned to the judiciary under our state government).
1
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judicial," the agency's action is upheld as constitutional.6 This Note examines
this and other approaches used by courts to reconcile this apparent conflict
and suggests an alternative approach to that used by the Missouri Supreme
Court in State Tax Commission v. Administrative Hearing Commission.'
In State Tax Commission, the Commission circulated a letter to assessors
and certain taxpayers which stated that a new formula had been adopted for
determining the value of leased tangible personal property. The letter asked
taxpayers who lease such property to file a revised tax return containing infor-
mation consistent with the suggested formula.
Shortly after the letter was circulated, International Business Machines
Corporation (IBM) filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Com-
mission (AHC). The complaint asked the AHC to declare the new formula
void because the State Tax Commission had issued the formula without fol-
lowing the rulemaking procedures set forth in Missouri Revised Statutes sec-
tion 536.021.8 After an evidentiary hearing, the AHC held that it could render
a declaratory judgment and found that the State Tax Commission's letter was
void because it had not been properly filed.
6. See, e.g., Liechty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 162 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Mo.
1942) (although the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission determines ques-
tions of a purely legal nature, its functions are constitutional because the Commission
is a ministerial and administrative body with quasi-judicial powers).
7. 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
8. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021 (1978). Basically, this section requires that
before a state agency may make, amend, or rescind any agency rule it must first file
with the secretary of state a notice of the proposed rule change. Section 536.021(2)
further requires that the notice contain, among other things, the text of the proposed
rule change and an explanation of the change.
9. The AHC found that Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.050(2) (1978), when read in
conjunction with Mo. REV. STAT. § 161.333 (1978), gave the AHC the power to
render declaratory judgments concerning agency rules. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.050(2)
(1978) provides:
The validity or applicability of any rule, regulation, resolution, announced
policy, applied policy, or any similar official or unofficial interpretation or im-
plementation of state agency authority, other than in a contested case or in a
law enforcement proceeding, may be determined in an action to be brought by
the filing of a written complaint with the administrative hearing commission
by any interested person, or duly constituted entity, who is affected by such
interpretation or implementation in a manner or to a degree distinct and dif-
ferent from other members of the general public. The complaint shall set
forth the manner or degree in which the agency action or position affects the
complainant, and the reasons for believing such action or position to be inva-
lid or inapplicable to the complainant.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 161.333 (1978) provides: "The administrative hearing commission
shall conduct hearings, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue deci-
sions in those cases involving complaints filed pursuant to the provisions of section
536.050, RSMo." The AHC further found that the State Tax Commission's letter was
a policy statement of general applicability and therefore a rule as defined under Mo.
REV. STAT. § 536.010.4 (1978). State Tax Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 72 & n.3.
1984]
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On review, the supreme court vacated the AHC's decree, 10 holding that,
under the separation of powers clause," the AHC could not render a declara-
tory judgment.12 Judge Welliver, writing for a unanimous court, stated that
"[t]he declaration of the validity or invalidity of statutes and administrative
rules . . . is purely a judicial function" and that "[u]nder our Constitution the
lawmakers cannot vest purely judicial functions in an administrative
agency.""1
3
The generally a'zcepted meaning of the separation of powers doctrine is
that all government powers-legislative, judicial, and executive-are divided
into three distinct departments and that each department is prohibited from
exercising the others' power.' 4 This diffusion of power prevents "the abuses
that can flow from the centralization of power."'" As James Madison wrote in
The Federalist Papers: "[t]he accumulation of all powers . . . in the same
hands . . . [is] the very definition of tyranny."'" In short, the concentration of
power invites autocracy; the diffusion of power promotes liberty.
Although the validity of the separation of powers doctrine has been ques-
tioned,' 7 its importance is firmly entrenched at both the federal and state
levels. Justice Frankfurter wrote that while the doctrine may be attacked as
obstructive to effective government, it is essential to our continued freedom.
"The accretion of dangerous power," he wrote, "does not come in a day. It
10. State Tax Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 72.
11. Mo. CONsT. art. II, § 1. This section provides that:
[t]he powers of government shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments-the legislative, executive, and judicial-each of which shall be con-
fided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons,
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those depart-
ments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others,
except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
12. 641 S.W.2d at 76.
13. Id. at 75 (quoting State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
303 Mo. 212, 219, 259 S.W. 445, 447 (1924)).
14. Force, Administrative Adjudication of Traffic Violations Confronts the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 49 TUL. L. REV. 84, 88 (1974); see also
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) ("The Constitution, in distrib-
uting the powers of government, creates three distinct and separate departments ....
Its object is basic and vital, . . . namely, to preclude a commingling of. . . essentially
different powers of government in the same hands."). On the history of the separation
of powers doctrine see Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of
Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935); Parker, Separation of Powers Revisited-Its
Meaning to Administrative Law, 49 MICH. L. REv. 1009, 1011-20 (1951).
15. 641 S.W.2d at 73-74.
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 334 (J. Madison) (H. Dawson, University ed.
1888).
17. See, e.g., Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N.C.L. REv. 183,
198 (1940) ("The dead weight of alleged separation-of-powers limitations should be
cast overboard finally and definitively, bag and baggage."); Kinnane, Administrative
Law: Some Observations on Separation of Powers, 38 A.B.A. J. 19, 19 (1952) ("The
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does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard
of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of
authority."' 8
Although most state constitutions expressly prohibit one branch of gov-
ernment from exercising any power granted to another branch,' 9 the realities
of government prevent a total separation of powers. In Massett Building Co. v.
Bennett,20 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the separation of powers
doctrine "has nowhere been construed as creating three mutually exclusive
water-tight compartments. To do so would render government unworkable and
the slave of a doctrine that has for its beneficial purpose the prevention of
despotism.. .. 2 As noted in Rhodes v. Bell," it is not the purpose of Mis-
souri's Constitution to create a total separation of governmental powers.
Rather, each branch must interact harmoniously with the other branches. 2'
The tension between adherence to the separation of powers doctrine and
the need for some "mixing" of government functions is most evident in the
delegation of judicial functions to administrative agencies. Administrative law
and administrative agencies are as old as the American system of govern-
ment.24 The first two agencies were created in 1789.25 By 1900, one-third of
all federal peacetime agencies were created and by 1930, another one-third
had been established.26 This tremendous growth was not unopposed. On politi-
cal' 7 and constitutional 28 grounds, administrative agencies faced stiff opposi-
tion. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis writes that "[t]he desire was to kill the
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19. See supra note 3.
20. 4 N.J. 53, 71 A.2d 327 (1950) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that a
New Jersey statute that allowed judicial investigations of city affairs violated the
state's separation of powers requirement).
21. Id. at 57, 71 A.2d at 329.
22. 230 Mo. 138, 130 S.W. 465 (1910) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the
circuit court had violated Missouri's separation of powers doctrine by performing the
"legislative" act of setting the time at which it would convene).
23. Id. at 150, 130 S.W. at 468; see also N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 37 (The
branches of government should remain separate in such a way "as is consistent with
that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissolu-
ble bond of union and amity.").
24. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20 (2d ed. 1984).
25. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 17 (2d ed. 1978). Congress
established the first agency by the Act of July 31, 1789. This agency was established to
estimate import duties and perform other related functions. The second agency was
created by President Washington to provide military pensions for those wounded in the
Revolutionary War. Id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 8 (5th ed. 1973).
Davis states that administrative agencies, especially the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the National Labor Relations Board, were viewed by many (especially
lawyers) as pro-labor and anti-management.
28. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 25, at 19.
1984]
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agencies, using whatever weapon would most effectively get the deed done.
• . . The growing antagonism of the bar toward the administrative process was
unmistakable."2 9 Despite this opposition, federal administrative agencies, par-
ticularly during the New Deal, continued to grow in both number and power.
Administrative agencies also have long been a part of Missouri govern-
ment.30 Like their federal counterparts, Missouri agencies experienced rapid
growth in both number and authority.31 Before the creation of the AHC, per-
sons involved in a dispute with an agency were bound by the procedures of
Missouri's Administrative Procedure Act. 32 These procedures suffered from a
basic flaw-lack of fairness. In the "classic case," 33 the agency, after receiving
a complaint, would investigate some alleged illegal conduct. Then, based on its
investigation, the agency would decide whether to proceed or drop the case. If
it proceeded, the agency would conduct a hearing at which its members (who
had already decided that the evidence supported the allegations of illegal con-
duct) would re-evaluate the same evidence and render a decision. In these
proceedings, the agency functioned as prosecutor, judge, and jury.34 The per-
son against whom the allegations were made had little or no real defenses. 35
Moreover, the statute governing judicial review of agency rulings placed a
heavy burden on those challenging these rulings.36
The AHC was designed to eliminate the unfairness inherent in this "pros-
ecutor-judge-jury syndrome" 37 by allowing a neutral lawyer (a commissioner)
to hold a "fair and impartial hearing in compliance with due process of the
law."138 In short, the AHC was created to place an independent and unbiased
decisionmaker "between agencies and those persons affected by their
29. Id. at 19-20.
30. See generally E. Fair, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN MISSOURI (1923). For
example, Professor Fair notes that two of Missouri's more important administrative
agencies, the Public Service Commission and the State Board of Health, were estab-
lished in 1913 and 1883, respectively. Id. at 15, 229.
31. Symposium, A Survey of Missouri Administrative Agencies, 19 UMKC L.
REV. 227, 230 (1951).
32. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010-.140 (1969) (revised 1978).
33. Special Project, Fair Treatment for the Licensed Professional: The Mis-
souri Administrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L. REV. 410, 438 (1972).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.140.2 (1978). This section provides that the
judicial inquiry may extend to a determination of whether the action of the agency:
(1) [i]s in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) [i]s in excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) [i]s unsupported by com-
petent and substantial evidence upon the whole record; (4) [i]s, for any rea-
son, unauthorized by law; (5) [i]s made upon unlawful procedure or without a
fair trial; (6) [i]s arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (7) [i]nvolves an
abuse of discretion.
37. Special Project, supra note 31, at 442 (quoting then Lt. Gov. Thomas F.
Eagleton).
38. Id. at 412.
[Vol. 49
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actions."' ' 9
Despite the growth and general acceptance of administrative agencies,
questions about the constitutional limits of their power still linger. How "judi-
cial" or "legislative" may the acts of an agency be? In answering this question
courts usually have examined the similarities between administrative proceed-
ings and court proceedings. A few older cases concentrate on the procedural
similarities.4 0 These cases determined whether an agency was exercising judi-
cial powers by considering the extent to which its proceedings resembled those
of a court.41 For example, in Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury,4 2 the
California Supreme Court held unconstitutional the delegation of judicial
functions to the State Workmen's Compensation Commission, where the com-
mission had the power to administer oaths, issue subpoenas, take testimony,
and punish for contempt "in like manner and to the same extent as courts of
record."4
An approach that focuses on procedural similarities has three serious
flaws. First, it is superficial. The court arrives at its decision without examin-
ing the principles behind the separation of powers doctrine and whether the
agency's action violates those principles. Second, the approach may not be an
effective safeguard against unwarranted delegations of judicial power. The leg-
islature may grant an agency "real" judicial power,44 yet a court may not
detect the unwarranted delegation because the power is exercised in hearings
which do not possess the trappings of a customary court proceeding.45 Finally,
such an approach produces the peculiar result of allowing an agency, whose
hearings lack the procedural safeguards of a court proceeding, to determine an
individual's rights and duties while prohibiting another agency from perform-
39. 641 S.W.2d at 75.
40. See, e.g., Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 157 P. 491
(1916) (Industrial Accident Commission, which had the power to hear complaints, is-
sue service of process, compel attendance of witnesses, determine issues, and make final
judgments or awards, was vested with judicial power in violation of California's separa-
tion of powers requirement); Boyd v. Motl, 236 S.W. 487, 495-97 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) (The Board of Water Engineers, which had the power to consider "certified
filings" (i.e., pleadings) and affidavits, hear evidence, and render written decisions, was
unconstitutionally vested with judicial power), rev'd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458 (1926)
(power vested in Board not unconstitutional).
41. Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L.
REV. 261, 268 (1935).
42. 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491 (1916).
43. Id. at 411, 156 P. at 493.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
45. See, e.g., State v. Hathaway, 115 Mo. 36, 21 S.W. 1081 (1893) (upholding
constitutionality of State Board of Health's licensing power, quoting approvingly from
United States v. Ferreira, 13 U.S. (How.) 40 (1852) in which Court stated that a
territorial court did not possess judicial power because it did not exercise its power "in
the ordinary forms of a court of justice[,]" in that there was no suit, no parties in the
legal sense, and no process to issue). Under Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 110, art. 1 § 6872
(1889) (current version at Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.100 (1978)), those denied licenses by
the State Board of Health had no direct judicial review of the Board's decision.
1984]
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ing those same functions because that agency's hearings afford an individual
important procedural safeguards.46
A much more common approach to resolve the apparent conflict between
administrative adjudication and the separation of powers doctrine is for the
court to examine the functions the agency performs.4 Under this "functional
approach," if the agency's functions are deemed "judicial" its exercise of those
functions is declared unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. On the other hand, if the agency's action is merely "quasi-judicial"
or "administrative," the action does not violate that doctrine. For example, in
Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association,48 the court held unconstitu-
tional a statute that allowed a medical review panel 49 to "make conclusions of
law and fact 'according to the applicable substantive law.' "0 The court stated
that the application of law is inherently a judicial function. Since the statute
in question allowed persons outside the judiciary to apply the law, it violated
the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution."1 In State ex rel.
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Commission, 2 the Missouri Su-
preme Court struck down a money award made by the Public Service Com-
mission because "[t]o determine whether one person is entitled to recover
money from another .. .cannot be anything but a judicial question [i.e.,
function], and as such must be determined by the courts." 3 The court con-
cluded that "under [the Missouri] Constitution the lawmakers cannot vest
purely judicial functions" in an administrative agency."
State Tax Commission is a "functional approach" case. In determining
whether the AHC's action was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power, the Missouri Supreme Court simply inquired whether the administra-
tive act in question was a judicial function. Concluding that the issuance of a
declaratory judgment is "purely a judicial function" 5 the court held that the
46. Brown, supra note 41, at 269-70.
47. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I11. 2d 313, 318, 347
N.E.2d 736, 739-40 (1976) (statute establishing a medical review panel to hear and
determine medical malpractice cases held unconstitutional as, inter alia, a violation of
separation of powers); State ex reL Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 303
Mo. 212, 219, 259 S.W. 445, 447 (1924) (granting a money judgment was an unconsti-
tutional exercise of judicial power by the Public Service Commission); State v. Osborn,
32 N.J. 117, 127-28, 160 A.2d 42, 48 (1960) (statute establishing a "marine naviga-
tion court" granted certain members of the executive branch judicial functions in viola-
tion of separation of powers).
48. 63 II1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
49. The panel consisted of a doctor, a lawyer, and a judge. Id. at 322, 347
N.E.2d at 738.
50. Id. at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40.
51. ILL. CONST. art. II, § I states that "[tihe legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
52. 303 Mo. 212, 259 S.W. 445.
53. Id. at 218, 259 S.W. at 447.
54. Id. at 219, 259 S.W. at 447.
55. 641 S.W.2d at 75.
860 [Vol. 49
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AHC's action violated the separation of powers clause of Missouri's
Constitution. 8
The realities of government, i.e., that administrative agencies perform
some judicial functions, 57 plus the difficulty of distinguishing between "judi-
cial" and "non-judicial" functions, 58 have led courts applying the functional
approach to establish a new category of judicial power--"quasi-judicial"
power. A precise definition of this concept has proved elusive. In Mulhearn v.
Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,59 Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New
Jersey Supreme Court wrote that "quasi-judicial" refers not to the quality of
the adjudication but to its origin outside the judiciary.60 In other words,
whether an act is judicial or quasi-judicial depends not on the nature of the
act, but on the tribunal in which it occurs.6 Professor Robert Force asserts
that "quasi-judicial" often refers to the different purpose served by adminis-
trative adjudication.6 2 For administrative agencies, adjudication is merely a
means to an end.6 3 While the agency may possess the power to hear and deter-
mine controversies, this "quasi-judicial" power is merely ancillary to the per-
formance of its administrative function. Force writes that "where an agency is
authorized to resolve problems between private parties (workmen's compensa-
tion), or between a private party and government (license revocation), the
agency does not adjudicate merely to resolve a dispute but rather to promote
some established public policy which the agency is charged to implement. 16 4
The concept of "quasi-judicial" power has been harshly criticized. Critics
claim that courts label an action "quasi-judicial" as a mere conclusion to sup-
port decisions that allow or disallow an agency's action. 5 In Springer v. Phil-
56. Id. at 76.
57. See, e.g., Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N.J. 99, 104, 71 A.2d 624, 626
(1950) ("Where the administrative tribunal's function partakes of the judicial, its exer-
cise is styled 'quasi-judicial,' but it is the exercise of judicial power nonetheless
58. See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 234 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc) ("[T]he boundaries which separate the powers and functions of the govern-
mental branches are difficult to point out and . . . in some areas they may overlap.").
59. 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d 726 (1949) (the Division of Workmen's Compensation
is not a "court" in the constitutional sense, therefore, the supreme court cannot review
its judgments directly by certification.).
60. Id. at 365, 66 A.2d at 730.
61. Wade, 'Quasi-Judicial' and Its Background, 10 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 216, 231-
32 (1949); see also 1 Aii. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 161 (1962) (" 'Quasi-judicial
is . . .used to designate a judicial function, but to indicate that it is exercised by a
person other than a judge.").
62. Force, supra note 14, at 109-110.
63. Id. at 109.
64. Id. at 110.
65. In FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing), Justice Jackson wrote:
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or
quasi-judicial, as the occasion requires in order to validate their functions
within the separation of powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat
1984]
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lipine Islands,66 Justice Holmes noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld congressional delegation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions
to administrative agencies, even though this delegation is "softened by a
qu asi. '67
The "functional approach" is flawed not only because of the difficulty of
distinguishing "judicial" from "non-judicial" functions, but also because the
approach misinterprets the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine. For
example, in State Tax Commission, the court stated that "the doctrine of sep-
aration . . . would be reduced to a mere shibboleth were this attempted grant
of power [allowing the AHC to issue declaratory judgments concerning agency
rules] sustained." '68 The court seems to suggest that the purpose of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine is to preserve for the judiciary a certain number or
type of particular functions. Yet, James Madison asserted that the doctrine
was designed not to distribute governmental functions but, rather, to prevent
the concentration of governmental powers. In The Federalist Papers Madison
writes "[it is only] where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department [that]
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted." 9 In David v.
Vesta Co.,70 the court emphasized that the separation of powers doctrine
should not be viewed as an end in itself, but rather should be used to prevent
the "concentration of unchecked power in the hands of" one branch of govern-
ment.71 Nowak, Rotunda, and Young write that a separation of functions con-
cept runs counter to the system of checks and balances. 2
The flaws of the "functional approach" stem from its failure to distin-
guish "judicial power" from "judicial function. 173 The Missouri Constitution,
to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized classi-
fications have broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw
over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
66. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
67. Id. at 210 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 1 Am. JUR 2D Administrative
Law § 161 (1962) (the term "quasi-judicial" is used simply as a convenient way of
approving the exercise of judicial power by administrative agencies).
68. 641 S.W.2d at 77.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 336 (J. Madison) (H. Dawson, University ed.
1888) (emphasis in original). One objection to the adoption of the United States Con-
stitution was that it allowed a blending of governmental functions. Madison, in refuting
this argument, wrote that the idea that the branches of government must be separate
and distinct "totally" misconceives and misapplies the separation of powers doctrine.
Id.
70. 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965) (statute granting the Director of the
Division on Civil Rights the right to hear and determine complaints does not violate
separation of powers).
71. Id. at 326, 212 A.2d at 358-59 (emphasis in original).
72. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HORNBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 136 (2d ed. 1983); see also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 68
(1958) ("The principle of check should guide the allocation of governmental power.
• . . [t]he danger is not blended power. The danger is unchecked power.").
73. For a good discussion of this idea see Force, supra note 14, at 93-98.
[Vol. 49
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like others, separates powers, not functions. Judicial power may be defined
many ways. Chief Justice Marshall suggested that judicial power is the power
"to say what the law is."7 In Harris v. Pine Cleaners,7" the court noted that
judicial power is the power to pronounce and enforce a judgment.7 6 However,
the essence of judicial power, it is submitted, is the power to determine with
finality what the law is. 7 As Professor Frank R. Strong states, "[fjinality of
decision is the very hallmark of judicial action. '78
Judicial function, on the other hand, is the capacity to act in a-way that
"appertains to the judicial power."' 79, In this sense, it is synonymous with "ad-
judication" which may be defined as a determination, decision, or sentence.80
The "judicial function" is to determine facts and apply law. The "judicial
power," on the other hand, is to state with finality what the law is.
The distinction between judicial power and judicial function is crucial to
the proper understanding of the separation of powers doctrine.8 1 This doctrine
expressly prohibits the exercise of judicial powers by the non-judicial branches
of government, but it does not prohibit the other branches from exercising
judicial functions.8
To insure that judicial power remains within the judicial branch, courts
must have the power to review administrative "judicial" decisions.8 3 Missouri
74. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
75. 274 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
76. Id. at 333 (Industrial Commission possessed the power to apply principles of
law to facts found, determine liability, and discharge anyone whom it finds to be not
liable).
77. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 288 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (to vest administrative
agency decisions with finality would "sap the judicial power" of the federal courts);
Force, supra note 14, at 97-98 ("[T]he essence of judicial power in the constitutional
sense is that power to make the final determination of the constitutionality or legality
of legislative and executive action."); 1 AM. JuR. 2D Administrative Law § 170 (1962)
(if an administrative agency's action was final, it would be an unconstitutional exercise
of judicial power).
78. Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-
Constitutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 249, 254 (1967).
79. BLACic's LAW DICTIONARY 761 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
80. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 27 (3d ed. 1961).
81. In Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d
726 (1949), the court stated:
The failure to comprehend that administrative adjudication is not judicial
springs from the erroneous notion that all adjudication is judicial. This is not
so and never has been so.. . . Were the rule otherwise and were every execu-
tive, administrative, legislative, or municipal adjudication deemed judicial and
the official or body making the adjudication regarded as a judge or a court,
we should be driven to treat every public official in the State . . .as a judge
or a court-a conclusion so extravagant that its mere statement demonstrates
its fallaciousness as well as its undesirability.
82. Id. at 364-65, 66 A.2d at 730.
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law insures that power. 84 The failure to distinguish judicial power from judi-
cial function can lead to poor decisions. In Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital
Association,8 5 the court stated, "[tihe application of principles of law is inher-
ently a judicial function . ..and article VI, section 1, of the Constitution
vests the exclusive and entire judicial power in the courts."'86 Both portions of
this statement are true (i.e., applying the law is a judicial function and the
Illinois Constitution does give exclusive judicial power to the courts8 7) yet, be-
cause the court did not distinguish judicial power from judicial functions, it
concluded that the statute in question was unconstitutional. Wright has been
severely criticized.8 8 Professor Davis contends that "[n]o state government can
operate without administrative application of principles of law to the facts of
particular cases."'8 9 He adds that Wright is so extreme that Illinois courts will
be forced to overrule it or interpret it away."
State Tax Commission presents another interesting problem. The court
states that the Missouri legislature, in granting the AHC the power to render
declaratory judgments regarding the validity of agency rules, attempted to ele-
vate the AHC to the status of a constitutional court.9' In support of this argu-
84. Missouri's Constitution provides direct judicial review of "[a]ll final deci-
sions, findings, rules and orders of any administrative officer or body . . . which arejudicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights. . . ." Mo. CONST. art. V, § 18, In
addition, section 536.100 provides that any person aggrieved by a final administrative
decision who has exhausted all administrative remedies is entitled to judicial review of
that decision unless otherwise provided by statute. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.100 (1978).
Section 536.150 permits indirect judicial review of administrative decisions through
injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, or other appropriate action. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 536.150 (1978). Clearly these provisions preserve for the judicial branch the
power to finally determine the rights and duties of persons affected by administrative
decisions. The respondents in State Tax Commission did argue that judicial review
prevents the AHC from usurping the judicial function. However, the court stated that
this "argument, carried to its logical conclusion, would mean that the legislative and
executive branches could exercise powers constitutionally reserved to the judiciary as
long as judicial review was available. Yet, it "is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.'" 641 S.W.2d at 77 (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
85. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
86. Id. at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 739.
87. ILL CONST. art. II, § 1 states that "[tihe legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 1 states that "[t]he judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court,
an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."
88. See I K. DAVIs, supra note 25, at 183-84.
89. Id. at 185.
90. Id. Davis' criticism could also be applied to State Tax Commission; its lan-
guage is yery similar to that used in Wright. For example, the court states that the
declaration of the validity of administrative rules is purely a judicial function and that
the state's judicial power is solely vested in the courts. Therefore, the court concluded,
it is unconstitutional for the AHC to issue declaratory judgments concerning agency
rules. 641 S.W.2d at 75.
91. 641 S.W.2d at 76.
[Vol. 49
11
Cowherd: Cowherd: Administrative Hearing Commission and the Separation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
SEPARATION OF POWERS
ment the court notes that section 536.050(2)92 allows a person to file his com-
plaint either before the AHC or a circuit court.9' Yet, the court also states
that an administrative agency is not a constitutional court even though it de-
termines issues of a "purely legal nature," if such issues are merely incidental
and necessary to the proper discharge of its administrative functions.94 In
other words, the AHC may be able to render a declaratory judgment if it is
incidental and necessary to the action before it, but it may not do so if the
declaratory judgment is the focus of the litigation. Thus, the anomaly arises
that the same act is constitutional in one setting while unconstitutional in
another.9 5
Not all Missouri cases that have addressed the constitutionality of admin-
istrative adjudication have applied a strict "functional approach." 96 In Harris
v. Pine Cleaners,97 the court seemed to recognize that exercise of judicial func-
tions by an agency is not necessarily a usurpation of judicial power. In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the
court noted that both Missouri's Constitution9 " and its Administrative Proce-
dure Act99 recognize that some agency decisions are "judicial" or "quasi-judi-
cial" and provide for court review of those decisions. 100 The court concluded
that "[t]he 'judicial power of the state' as meant by the Constitution is, there-
fore, not usurped by the Commission, but is reserved to the courts."''
92. Mo. REV. STAT. (1978); see supra note 9.
93. 641 S.W.2d at 76. The court noted that the Report of the Select Committee
on Administrative Rule Making stated that under section 536.050 "an aggrieved per-
son would have his choice of following either the present provisions relating to declara-
tory judgment, [i.e., bring the action in circuit court] or of filing a petition before the
Administrative Hearing Commission."
94. Id. at 75.
95. This result is often defended on the ground that the agency is exercising
"quasi-judicial" powers in one setting (the constitutional setting) and "judicial" powers
in the other. See supra text accompanying notes 57-64. However, as noted earlier, the
quasi-judicial concept is both fraught with uncertainty and logically infirm. See supra
text accompanying notes 65-67.
96. See, e.g., State v. Weinstein, 322 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Mo. 1959) (en banc)
(court, in upholding the constitutionality of actions taken by the State Highway De-
partment, quoted with approval Davis's statement that the guiding principle in the con-
trol of administrative agencies is the principle of check); In re City of Kinlock, 362 Mo.
434, 440, 242 S.W.2d 59, 63 (1951) (officials who determine facts and apply law do
not necessarily exercise "judicial power" in a constitutional sense); State v. Missouri's
Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 320 Mo. 893, 898, 8 S.W.2d 897, 899 (1928)
(commission performs judicial functions but not vested with judicial powers in the con-
stitutional sense).
97. 274 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
98. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 18 (formerly art. V, § 22); see supra note 84.
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010-.140 (1949) (current version at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 536.010-.215).
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In State v. Ridge,10 2 the plaintiff contended that determination of facts by
the Public Service Commission was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial
power. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the
plaintiff ignored the provisions of Missouri law providing for judicial review of
the Commission's findings. The court added that "[i]n view of the provisions
for court review, the regulation and control of public utilities by the com-
misssion is not an exercise of judicial power." 103
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in State Tax Commission creates
two problems. First, the decision cast the duty of issuing declaratory judg-
ments concerning agency rules upon circuit court judges who, in general, pos-
sess less experience and expertise in administrative law than the AHC. More
importantly, State Tax Commission creates greater uncertainty in the proper
distribution of government functions. Under the approach used in State Tax
Commission, whether a government official is exercising his proper functions
depends on whether that function is deemed "purely judicial" or "purely exec-
utive" or merely "quasi-legislative." As courts have often admitted, such dis-
tinctions are often very difficult to make, and make consistently.104
I These problems could be avoided if the Supreme Court would distinguish
a government branch's power from its functions. The functions of each branch
are, to some extent, exercised by the other branches. This is a necessary reality
of government. To determine the extent to which these functions may be
"mixed" in the name of the separation of powers adds unnecessary uncertainty
to the law. Both the spirit and letter of the separation of powers clause are
upheld if each branch retains its unique and essential power. For the judiciary,
that power is the authority to say with finality what the law is.
JOHN COWHERD
102. 345 Mo. 1096, 138 S.W.2d 1012 (1940) (en banc).
103. Id. at 1102, 138 S.W.2d at 1015.
104. See State ex reL Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 234 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc) ("the functions of the governmental branches are difficult to point out and in
some areas they may overlap.").
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